Designing pension benefits when longevities increase with wages = Hogyan tervezzük a nyugdíjjáradék-függvényt,

ha a halandóság a kereset csökkenő függvénye? by Simonovits, András
    
 
MŰHELYTANULMÁNYOK                           DISCUSSION PAPERS  
 
INSTITUTE OF ECONOMICS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC AND REGIONAL STUDIES,  
HUNGARIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES - BUDAPEST, 2018 
 
MT-DP – 2018/4 
 
 
 
 
Designing pension benefits  
when longevities increase with wages
  
ANDRÁS SIMONOVITS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
2 
 
Discussion papers 
MT-DP – 2018/4 
 
Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies,  
Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
 
KTI/IE Discussion Papers are circulated to promote discussion and provoque comments.  
Any references to discussion papers should clearly state that the paper is preliminary. 
Materials published in this series may subject to further publication. 
Designing pension benefits when longevities increase with wages 
Author: 
 
 
András Simonovits 
research advisor 
Institute of Economics 
 Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
also Mathematical Institute of Budapest University of Technology 
E-mail: simonovits. andras@krtk.mta.hu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
February 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 Designing pension benefits  
when longevities increase with wages 
 
András Simonovits 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
At the design of public pension systems, the designers frequently neglect that higher earners 
statistically live longer, and possibly also retire later. Since the first difference has recently 
been rising steeply, this negligence is less and less tolerable, especially with nonfinancial 
defined contribution system (NDC). We analyze three simple connected pension models to 
understand how the redistribution from the low-earners to the high-earners can be reduced 
or reversed. Our answers: either mixing NDC and flat benefit or reducing the weight of wage 
indexation of benefits. It is an open question how the neglected behavioral reactions (lower 
share of NDC implies lower labor supply and greater tax evasion) influence the social welfare.  
 
 
Keywords:  public pension system, retirement age, wage indexation, wage-dependent life 
expectancy 
 
JEL:  D10, H55 
 
 
Acknowledgement 
 
I express my debt to Robert Holzmann for focusing my attention to the topic and to Nicholas 
Barr, Hans Fehr, László Halpern, Mária Lackó for their constructive remarks on a related 
paper. 
 
 
4 
 
Hogyan tervezzük a nyugdíjjáradék-függvényt,  
ha a halandóság a kereset csökkenő függvénye? 
 
Simonovits András 
 
 
Összefoglaló 
A nyugdíjrendszerek tervezésénél általában figyelmen kívül hagyják, hogy minél jobban keres 
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1. Introduction
When a government (re)designs a public pension system, it has to take into account
the dual task of any pension system: income replacement and old-age poverty relief.
The first function is well-served by earnings-related systems especially the so-called
nonfinancial defined contribution (for short, NDC) system and the second function by
a flat benefit. The simplest compromise between the two tasks is a well-chosen linear
combination of the two pure systems. Typically the designers neglect the dependence
of the life expectancy (longevity) on wages, therefore overestimate the socially optimal
value of the NDC component. Recently a number of studies have emphasized the
growing strength of the neglected dependence, compelling the reconsideration of the
optimal combination. The present paper analyzes three very simple models to reconsider
these issues, assuming stationary population. In the rest of the Introduction, we shall
outline the problem, overview some of the literature, then present our contribution and
finally list three open problems.
Since NDC will play a central role in the paper, we recapitulate its essence. Here each
benefit is the ratio of the lifetime contribution (practically to wages) and the average
remaining life expectancy. In a first approximation, this system is fair and efficient. It is
fair because—apart from wage-dependent longevity—the lifetime contribution is equal
to the lifetime benefits (actuarial fairness). It is also efficient because (a) there is no
distinguished role for the normal retirement age and (b) as long as the population ages,
either the workers retire later or their benefit-to-net-wage ratios automatically decrease.
As is known, the OECD countries have widely differing pension systems, which
also change in time. Several countries have a dominant earnings-related public pension
system (e.g. Germany, France, etc.), while others have a smaller and progressive—
often flat—public pension system, complemented by a sizable private one (Anglo-Saxon
countries, Switzerland, etc.)
When judging the overall income redistribution of these pension systems, we should
take into account the dependence of the life expectancy (longevity) on lifetime wages;
especially that this dependence has become much stronger in the last decades. It is
evident that a seemingly earnings-related pension system is regressive, i.e. it shifts a
large part of the lifetime contribution of the citizens with shorter longevity to financing
the lifetime benefits of those with longer longevity. Similarly, an apparently progressive
system is close to neutral, i.e. the lifetime contributions and benefits are approximately
balanced.
There are two further complications in this regard. The first complication is that
within the same wage class, healthier workers have longer longevities, therefore they also
retire later. Any benefit schedule—most notably, the NDC—which rewards later retirees
and punishes early retirees on the actuarial basis of a common longevity, redistributes
from the statistically short-lived to the statistically long-lived.
The second complication is connected to the indexation of benefits in progress (or
in payment). There are two pure types of indexation: (a) wage-indexation increases
the nominal benefits by the growth rate of the average nominal wage, i.e. it leaves
the relative value of the benefit to net wage constant; (b) price-indexation increases
the nominal benefits by the consumer price index, i.e. it leaves the real value of the
benefit constant (once started). The first type corresponds to function (i) and the
second to function (ii). Among these two extremes, there is a continuum of indexations,
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represented by a linear combination of the two pure types. If the initial pension benefits
are set as to balance the lifetime contributions and benefits of a citizen with an average
life expectancy, then a third type of redistribution occurs: pensioners with high longevity
and high wage gain from wage indexation with low initial benefits, while pensioners with
low longevity and low wage gain from price indexation with high initial benefits. Note
also that stronger wage indexation encourages later retirement.
We turn to the short overview of the literature (see Pestieau and Ponthiere (2016)
for a general overview). It was probably Buchanan (1968) who first proposed the non-
financial defined contribution (NDC) public pension system, which emulates a funded
private system. Since this proposal has been made, a number of countries (first Sweden)
introduced the NDC (see, Holzmann and Palmer, eds. 2006; Holzmann, Palmer and
Robalino, eds., 2012). There are, however, theoretical problems with this system (e.g.
Legros, 2006 and Barr and Diamond, 2008, Chapter 3). A basic problem is that there
is no clear reason why the contribution rate should be constant when the population
severely ages.
Liebmann (2002) was perhaps the first economist who numerically evaluated the
real progressivity of the US Social Security and showed that it is close to neutrality.
Diamond and Orszag (2004) defended progressivity of the US system by appealing to the
key dependence. In a numerically calibrated, truly dynamic general equilibrium model,
Fehr, Kallweit and Kindermann (2013) suggested some progressivity for Germany on
similar grounds.
Sa´nchez–Romero and Prskawetz (2017) created a steady-state calibrated dynamic
general equilibrium model of the US, where wage differences are explained by human
capital accumulation; wage and life expectancy are only correlated and the initial Social
Security benefit formula is piecewise-linear function of the lifetime average wage.
Whitehouse and Zaidi (2008), The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine (2015) and Auerbach et al. (2017) equally emphasized the growing strength of
dependence of longevity on lifetime incomes and its impact on pension design. Ayuso,
Bravo and Holzmann (2016) presented a very simple model and suggested two adjust-
ments which we shall call B and C in the paper.
A lesser but still important problem of NDC is the adverse selection occurring within
any given wage class in choosing retirement age (Eso˝ and Simonovits, 2002; Diamond,
2003; Cremer, Lozachmeur and Pestieau, 2004; Eso˝, Simonovits and To´th, 2012; Si-
monovits, 2015): those who have higher remaining life expectancy at the minimal re-
tirement age, retire later, and gain from NDC which assumed a common longevity–
retirement age schedule. Because these models mostly assumed asymmetrical informa-
tion, they had to neglect wage (rate) heterogeneity.
Concerning indexation of benefits in progress, we call attention to Legros (2006) and
especially Barr and Diamond (2008, Subsection 5.1.4) which distinguished the indexing
of covered wages in calculating the initial benefits (valorization) and indexing of benefits
in payment (or in progress). Formulating the problem above we relied on the latter
source. Feldstein (1990) used a highly theoretical and impractical framework to discuss
the distribution of lifetime pensions. Weinzierl (2014) studied the impact of various
price indices and of heterogeneous longevities on the lifetime redistribution in the Social
Security.
Note that most of the papers neglect the gender differences or take it into account
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in a very rudimentary way. Though there is at least one mandatory (though funded
and private) pension system with sex-dependent life annuities (Chile), it prescribes
collective life annuities for couples and excludes widow(er)’s pensions. The extension
of individual pensions to family pensions is inevitable in future modeling (see Fehr,
Kallweit and Kindermann, 2016).
Turning to the contribution of our paper, we have to declare at the outset that we
deliberately work with very simple models. Each of the three models uses a static over-
lapping generations framework, where workers differ in wages and longevity while the
latter is an increasing function of the former. In Model 1, with time- and age-invariant
but heterogeneous real wages and benefits and wage-dependent life expectancy, we study
three adjustments to the traditional NDC: (A) a proportional downsizing of benefits to
eliminate the aggregate loss, (B) replacing average with wage-specific longevity in the
NDC formula and (C) mixing NDC with a flat benefit. Model 2 incorporates heteroge-
neous retirement ages, enhancing redistribution. Model 3 is another variant of Model 1
with annually rising real wages and partially wage-indexed benefits. These models and
the adjustments help us understand the impact of wage-dependent longevities on the
lifetime redistribution in a mixed NDC and flat system.
For expositional simplicity, we shall assume that the population is not only stable
but stationary; moreover, apart from longevity increasing in wage, there is no longevity
risk. The contribution rate is given. Each model is illustrated on an artificial numerical
example.
Our static models lack optimization (except for Model 1*), they work with ad hoc
parameter values, life expectancy is an exogenously given increasing function of wage
and the benefit formula is linear. Our only excuse is that working with such models
the exposition is more accessible and we are able to discuss new issues not treated by
Ayuso et al. (2016) or Sa´nchez–Romero and Prskawetz (2017) and others: Model 1* (in
Appendix) varies the weight of the NDC, Model 2 has heterogeneous retirement ages,
and Model 3 has partial wage-indexation.
At the end of the Introduction we formulate three open questions which can be dis-
cussed even in our elementary framework. (a) How do mandatory and voluntary pension
pillars influence the functioning of the public pillar? (Our Appendix is a preliminary
trial to model private savings as a defense against excessive old-age redistribution.) (b)
What is the quantitative connection between indexation and optimal retirement? (An
interface between Models 2 and 3.) (c) Taking into account labor disutility, what is the
quantitative impact of diminishing the share of the NDC on the welfare in the system?
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: Section 2 analyzes the
basic model with time- and age-invariant wages and benefits and income-dependent life
expectancy. Section 3 extends this model to heterogeneous retirement ages. Section 4
considers another variant with rising wages and partially wage-indexed benefits. Section
5 concludes. An Appendix extends the basic model to the optimal savings and socially
optimal weight of the NDC pensions.
2. Time- and age-invariant wages and common retirement ages
In this Section we concentrate on the case where workers born in a given year earn
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heterogeneous wages but these wages do not change with time/age in real terms. Our
main interest lies in the impact of heterogeneity in wages and longevities on the benefits,
longevity depending on wage.
Annual wages have a distribution function F (w). We need the following notations:
contribution rate τ ∈ (0, 1), retirement age R, starting age L, remaining life expectancy
at retirement of a worker with wage w, eR(w), where for a fixed R, eR(·) is increasing.
(We only use subindex R in anticipation Model 2, where R also depends on w.) We
need a benefit function, depending on wage and retirement age: b(w,R). We shall need
the lifetime net contribution (or balance):
z(w,R) = τw(R− L)− b(w,R)eR(w). (1)
The traditional NDC benefit is calculated with average remaining life expectancy eR =
EweR(w):
bN (w,R) =
τw(R− L)
eR
. (2N)
Substituting (2N) into (1) yields the lifetime net contribution:
zN (w,R) = τw(R− L)− τw(R− L)
eR
eR(w) =
τw(R− L)
eR
[eR − eR(w)].
Using (2N) again implies
Theorem 1. At traditional NDC (2N), the wage-dependent lifetime net contribu-
tion is equal to the product of the NDC benefit and of the difference between the average
and the wage-dependent remaining life expectancies:
zN (w,R) = bN (w,R)[eR − eR(w)]. (3N)
For symmetric (or other specific) wage distribution functions, we can define the
separator wage w(R) at which the wage-specific remaining life expectancy is equal to
the average one: eR(w(R)) = eR. An easy implication is as follows:
eR(w) < eR(w(R)) if w < w(R) and eR(w) > eR(w(R)) if w > w(R).
In certain cases, quantity w(R) might be independent of R and simply be equal to
the average wage, namely w(R) = Ew = 1.
Theorem 1 has a
Corollary. (a) For the traditional NDC, for earners with below-average life ex-
pectancy, the lifetime net contribution is positive (losers); for earners with above-average
life expectancy, the lifetime net contribution is negative (gainers). (b) The expected life-
time net contribution is negative.
Proof. (a) See (3N).
(b) Divide the wage distribution into two parts: below and above the separator wage.
Since bN (·, R) is an increasing function, it can be replaced by b(wR, R) for the average
life expectancy, thus increasing zN (w,R) for positive values and decreasing zN (w,R)
for negative values, hence Ez ≤ b(wR, R)EeR(w) = 0.
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Peter Diamond (private communication) suggested a simple adjustment for elimi-
nating the aggregate loss; to contract (scale-down) all the benefits with the same factor
γ:
bA(w,R) =
γτw(R− L)
eR
= γbN (1, R)w. (2A)
Inserting (2A) into (1) yields the adjusted lifetime balance:
zA(w,R) = bN (1, R)w[eR − γeR(w)]. (3A)
Taking expectations and equaling it to zero:
0 = EzA(w,R) = bN (1, R)E{w[eR − γeR(w)]},
hence
γA =
eR
E[weR(w)]
. (4A)
Note that even if we replace the assumption that eR(w) is an increasing function by
the weaker assumption that w and eR(w) are positively correlated, i.e. (using Ew = 1)
E[weR(w)] > eR, then γA < 1 remains valid.
Theorem 1A. At the proportionally scaled-down NDC [(2A)], the lifetime net
contribution is equal to the product of the unadjusted NDC benefit [(2N)] and of the
difference between the average and the contracted wage-dependent remaining life ex-
pectancy [(3A)] where the contracting factor γA is determined in (4A).
Following Ayuso et al. (2016), we shall discuss two further corrections to eliminate,
dampen or reverse this type of redistribution. Adjustment B simply divides the pension
wealth with the wage-specific life expectancy eR(w) rather than with the average eR.
Then
bB(w,R) =
(R− L)w
eR(w)
and zB(w,R) = 0. (2B)
In this modification, the adjustment factor depends on the wage: γB(w) = eR(w)/eR
but it is difficult to sell politically adjustment B.
Adjustment C linearly combines the adjusted NDC benefit and the flat one, where
the latter is equal to γbo = γbN (1, R) and the nonnegative weights are α and 1 − α,
respectively:
bC(w,R) = γαbN (w,R) + (1− α)γbo, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, bo = bN (1, R). (2C)
Substituting (2C) into (1) yields
zC(w,R) = boweR − [αγbow + (1− α)γbo]eR(w).
Taking the expectation and making it zero imply
0 = EwzC(w,R) = boeR − αγboE[weR(w)]− (1− α)γboeR.
Hence the α-dependent contraction factor γC is equal to
γC =
eR
(1− α)eR + αE[weR(w)] . (4C)
Note that for α = 1, (2C)–(4C) reduces to (2B)–(4B).
Diminishing the value of α, the direction of the redistribution changes. In summary,
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Theorem 1B. The benefit rule (2B) eliminates the perverse redistribution. The
benefit rule (2C)–(4C) weakens or even reverses perverse redistribution.
At the end of this Section, we illustrate our results on a simple numerical example.
Number of types: n = 3 with equal weights 1/3, τ = 0.25. L = 20, R = 60, α = 0.5 in
adjustment C. To make the results of the calculations simple, we use symmetric earnings
and remaining life expectancies, their values are given in columns 1 and 2 of Table 1,
respectively. Note that in ANDC, the absolute value of the loss of the low-earner is
much lower than the gain of the high-earner, the adjustment factor γA = 0.952. Benefit
adjustment B eliminates all redistribution, while adjustment C with α = 0.5 replaces
redistribution from the low LEXP to the high LEXP by redistribution to the other
direction, the adjustment factor is higher than before: γC = 0.976.
Table 1. NDC’s variations
LEXP A d j u s t e d N D C
Wage at ret. benefit-A balance-B benefit-B benefit-C balance-C
wi ei b
A
i z
A
i b
B
i b
C
i z
C
i
0.5 17 0.238 0.952 0.294 0.366 –1.220
1.0 20 0.476 0.476 0.5 0.488 0.244
1.5 23 0.714 –1.429 0.652 0.610 0.976
L = 20, R = 60, τ = 0.25, α = 0.5. zB1 = z
B
2 = z
B
2 = 0.
3. Heterogeneous retirement ages
We turn now to a less important but still relevant issue: what happens if the retirement
ages are also heterogeneous? Avoiding complex lifetime utility maximization, especially
when the government does not know the life expectancies (Diamond, 2003, etc.), we
simply assume that the longer one lives, the later retires, and taking into account that
the more one earns, the longer he lives, therefore R(w) is also an increasing function.
We have to repeat all the calculations for our heterogeneous retirement ages.
Start with the unadjusted NDC:
bN (w,R(w)) =
τw[R(w)− L]
eR(w)
, (5N)
where eR(w) is the average remaining life expectancy at age R(w), independent of w.
Because longer-lived and higher paid workers also retire later, and the average remaining
life expectancy eR(w) is lower, under (5N), the benefit is again an increasing function of
the wage. Therefore the corollary can be generalized and the average loss remains.
Turning to the proportionally adjusted NDC, (2A) is replaced by
bA(w,R(w)) =
γτw[R(w)− L]
eR(w)
. (5A)
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In contrast, earning w and retiring at age R(w), on average, she will live in retirement
for eR(w)(w), where the wage-dependence is explicit. Substituting (5A) into (3A) yields
zA(w,R(w)) =
τw[R(w)− L]
eR(w)
[eR(w) − γeR(w)(w)]. (6A)
Taking the expected value in (6A) and equalizing it to zero imply
0 = EzA(w,R(w)) = τE
{
w[R(w)− L]
eR(w)
[eR(w) − γeR(w)(w)]
}
,
hence γ is determined from
E[w[R(w)− L] ] = γAE
{
w[R(w)− L]
eR(w)
eR(w)(w)
}
. (7A)
As in Section 2, there are the same two simple corrections to eliminate or dampen
this type of redistribution. Rule B simply divides the accumulated virtual wealth by
the wage-specific eR(w)(w) rather than the average eR(w). Then
bB(w,R) =
τw[R(w)− L]
eR(w)(w)
and zB(w,R(w)) = 0. (5B)
This solution is again difficult to sell politically, therefore we propose a more sophis-
ticated one: partly preserve (5A) and combine it with a flat one. Introducing a scalar
α for the weight of the ANDC, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, the third modified benefit is equal to
bC(w,R) = α
γτw[R(w)− L]
eR(w)
+ (1− α)γbo, bo = bN (1, R(1)). (5C)
Substituting (5C) into (1) yields the lifetime balance:
zC(w,R(w)) = τw[R(w)− L]− αγτw[R(w)− L]
eR(w)
eR(w)(w)− (1− α)γboeR(w)(w).
Taking expectation and equaling it to zero imply
0 = τE[w[R(w)− L] ]− αγτEw[R(w)− L]eR(w)(w)
eR(w)
− (1− α)γboEeR(w)(w),
i.e.
E[w[R(w)− L] ] = γC
{
αE
w[R(w)− L]eR(w)(w)
eR(w)
+ (1− α)R(1)− L
eR(1)
EeR(w)(w)
}
.
(6C)
The α-dependent contraction factor γC is uniquely determined from (6C).
Note that for α = 1, (6C) reduces to (6A). Diminishing the value of α, the direction
of the redistribution changes.
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Theorem 2. With heterogeneous retirement ages, the benefit rule (5A)–(7A) elim-
inates the aggregate loss. The benefit rule (5B)–(6B) eliminates the perverse redistrib-
ution. The benefit rule (5C)–(6C) weakens or even reverses perverse redistribution.
At the end of this Section, we again illustrate our results on a simple numerical
example. For heterogeneous retirement ages, the simplest generalization of the LEXP–
wage function e60(w) = 20 + 6(w − 1) is as follows:
eR(w) = 80−R+ 6(w − 1).
Assuming that citizens spend 2/3 of their adult lives with work, R1 = 58, R2 = 60 and
R3 = 62.
Table 2 reports the new results. With retirement ages depending on life expectan-
cies, the ANDC contraction coefficient γA drops from 0.952 to 0.939 but the error of
the ANDC diminishes, for example the loss zA1 decreases from 0.952 to 0.897. With
adjustment B, only the early and late retirement ages influence the benefits. Due to the
proportionality of active and passive adult years, bBi = 0.5wi holds. With adjustment
C, the loss −zC1 = 1.22 turns to gain +1.89, while the gain −zC3 = 0.976 changes to loss
–1.654.
Table 2. NDC’s variations: heterogeneous R′
Retire. LEXP A d j u s t e d N D C
Wage age at ret. benefit-A balance-A benefit-B benefit-C balance-C
wi Ri eRi(wi) b
A
i z
A
i b
B
i b
C
i z
C
i
0.5 58 19 0.203 0.897 0.25 0.349 –1.890
1.0 60 20 0.470 0.609 0.50 0.488 0.236
1.5 62 21 0.822 –1.506 0.75 0.671 1.654
Remark. See Table 1. Ri − L = 2[Di − L]/3, i = 1, 2, 3.
4. Partial wage indexation of benefits
Until now we have neglected the secular rise of real wages and the resulting conflict
between relative consumption smoothing and the less than full wage indexation of ben-
efits in progress. Here we model the impact of the conflict on the gains and losses. Let
us assume that the real wages and the newly granted pension benefits grow uniformly
with an annual factor g > 1 but the pension in progress may grow more slowly than the
wages.
Consider a worker with initial wage wL who retires at the common age R, her last
year real wage is related to her initial one: wR−1 = wLgR−L−1. Due to valorization
(or indexation of initial benefits), her NDC wealth is equal to WR = (R − L)wR−1 =
(R−L)wLgR−L−1. Let D = R+eR be the life expectancy at birth and denote by bj the
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real value of the benefit at age j = R, . . . ,D − 1. Her expected cross-sectional liability
(discounted by the annual growth factor g) is equal to
WR =
D−1∑
j=R
g−j+Rbj .
Suppose that there is a scalar ι between 0 and 1, the weight of wage in benefit
indexation. Then
bj = bj−1gι, where j = R+ 1, . . . , D − 1.
(Note that in reality, the benefit’s growth factor is the weighted arithmetic average of
wage’s and price’s growth factors, i.e. ιg + 1− ι = (g − 1)ι+ 1.) Inserting this formula
to the previous one yields
(R− L)wR−1 = bR
D−1∑
j=R
g−(1−ι)(j−R).
To avoid superfluous separation of the analysis for ι = 1 and 0 ≤ ι < 1, we shall
introduce notation e(ι)R for the sum:
either e(1)R = eR, or e
(ι)
R =
1− g−(1−ι)eR
1− g−(1−ι) for 0 ≤ ι < 1.
Then the unadjusted NDC benefit is equal to
bN (wR−1, R) =
τ(R− L)wR−1
e
(ι)
R
. (8N)
Note that the higher the weight ι of wage in indexation, the greater the indexed remain-
ing life expectancy e(ι)R and the lower the starting benefits b
N (wR−1, R).
To take into account the heterogeneity in life expectancy, we postulate a distribution
F for closing wages wR−1 and we assume that there was no seniority wage rise, real
wages rose with calendar time but at the same growth factor g for everybody. We
are interested in the impact of indexation weight on the lifetime redistribution. For
normalization, EwR−1 = 1.
To avoid too much repetition, we only explore adjustment A here. We shall consider
the partial wage in indexation with correction A:
bA(wR−1, R) = γA
τ(R− L)wR−1
e
(ι)
R
. (8A)
Introducing notation
e
(1)
R (wR−1) = eR(wL) or e
(ι)
R (wR−1) =
1− g−(1−ι)eR(wR−1)
1− g−(1−ι) for 0 ≤ ι < 1, (9A)
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the lifetime balance is now
zA(wR−1, R) = τ(R− L)wR−1 − γbN (wR−1, R)e(ι)R (wR−1)
= bN (1, R)wR−1[e
(ι)
R − γAe(ι)R (wR−1)].
Taking the expectations and equalizing the result to zero imply
0 = EzA(wR−1, R) = bN (1, R)EwR−1[e
(ι)
R − γAe(ι)R (wR−1)].
Hence
γA =
e
(ι)
R
E[wR−1e
(ι)
R (wR−1)]
. (10A)
Theorem 3A. For indexed benefits, the adjusted NDC formula is given by (8A)
and the correction coefficient is provided by (9A)–(10A).
We complete our Section 4 with a numerical illustration. In details, let wR−1(i) =
0.5, 1, 1.5 again and their common growth factor is g = 1.02. Table 3 reports the
results for wage indexation: ι = 1, combined wage-price indexation: ι = 0.5 and price
indexation: ι = 0. It is quite surprising that the adjustment factor is hardly sensitive
to the type of indexation, it varies between 0.952 and 0.963. As the weight of wage in
indexation diminishes, for every type, the initial benefit uniformly rises (and the final
benefit, not shown, decreases). It is noteworthy that with wage indexation, not only
the ex-ante short-lived but also the average worker contributes to the ex-ante long-lived
worker’s benefit. On the other hand, with price indexation, the opposite holds.
Table 3. The impact of indexation on initial benefits and balances (A)
I n d e x a t i o n
Remaining w a g e w a g e - p r i c e p r i c e
Wage LEXP benefit balance benefit balance benefit balance
wi,R−1 ei b1i,R−1 z
1
i,R−1 b
0.5
i,R−1 z
0.5
i,R−1 b
0
i,R−1 z
0
i,R−1
0.5 17 0.238 0.952 0.263 0.870 0.289 0.791
1.0 20 0.476 0.476 0.525 0.420 0.577 0.369
1.5 23 0.714 –1.429 0.788 –1.290 0.866 –1.161
Remark. See Table 1, g = 1.02.
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5. Conclusions
We have discussed three related models of NDC with three different benefit adjustments.
In Model 1, the workers only differ in wages and life expectancies but retire at the same
age. Due to the positive correlation between wages and life expectancies, the scaled-
down NDC strongly redistributes from the short-lived poor to the long-lived rich. In
Model 2, we assume additionally that longer-lived workers also retire later, increasing
the perverse redistribution. In both models, we experimented with explicit income
redistribution in the pension formula. In Model 3 we return to common retirement age
but introduce secular real wage rise. Diminishing the weight of the wage in indexation,
the initial benefits rise and the direction of the redistribution is reversed.
In all the three models, we assumed that the workers do not react to the retirement
rules and the government chooses the rules ad hoc. There is a minor exception to
this approach: in the Appendix, we experiment with privately chosen savings but it
has no impact of the socially optimal contribution rate. Introducing individual and
social optimization in labor supply (including retirement age) and reported income,
may change our results. Especially the progressivity in the pension formula may weaken
the incentives to work more and retire later. Only better models can corroborate our
findings.
Appendix. Optimal mix and redistribution
In this Appendix, we want to discuss the optimal mix of the NDC and flat benefits
(adjustment C), i.e. their optimal shares in the basic model of Section 2. To do so, we
have to define individual lifetime utility functions, which are maximized by optimally
chosen individual savings. We neglect variations within the working and the retirement
periods, respectively.
Let s be a nonnegative real number, representing annual saving and ρ(w) ≥ 1 be
the corresponding compound interest factor. We shall approximate the true compound
interest factor by the corresponding power of the annual one, (ρ[1]) as if all saving and
dissaving were concentrated at the center of the accumulation and decumulation phases,
respectively:
ρ(w) = ρ[1](R−L+eR(w))/2. (A.1)
Then the annual young- and old-age consumption are approximated by
c = (1− τ)w − s and d = b(w) + µ(w)−1ρ(w)s, where µ(w) = eR(w)
R− L. (A.2)
To determine the optimal saving, one must postulate a discounted lifetime utility func-
tion:
U(w, c, d) = (R− L) log c+ eR(w)δ(w) log d, (A.3)
where δ(w) is the compound discount factor approximated by
δ(w) = δ[1, w](R−L+eR(w))/2, (A.4)
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where the annual discount factor δ[1, w] is an increasing function of the wage (cf. Si-
monovits, 2016).
Substituting the consumption equations (A.2) into the utility function (A.3), yields
U [w, s] = (R− L)[log((1− τ)w − s) + µ(w)δ(w) log(b(w) + µ(w)−1ρ(w)s)]. (A.5)
Taking its derivative and equating it to zero yields the optimum condition:
U ′s[w, s] ≈ −
1
(1− τ)w − s +
δ(w)ρ(w)
b(w) + µ(w)−1ρ(w)s
= 0.
Then the optimal saving is as follows:
s(w) =
[δ(w)(1− τ)w − b(w)ρ(w)−1]+
µ(w)−1 + δ(w)
, (A.6)
where subindex + is the positive part of the corresponding expression.
Next we define the social welfare function (cf. Feldstein, 1985 as modified in Si-
monovits, 2016), replacing discounted utilities by undiscounted ones:
V [α, τ ] = (R− L)E[log((1− τ)w − s(w)) + eR(w) log(b(w) + ρ(w)s(w))]. (A.7)
As is usual, we shall use relative efficiency rather than social welfare function to evaluate
the optimum. Let the positive real number ε be the relative efficiency of the transfer
system in terms of no transfer if by multiplying the wages in the latter the new social
welfare becomes equal to that obtain in the former without changing the wages (and
benefits). In formula:
V (α, τ, 1) = V (0, 0, ε)
Using the special properties of the logarithmic utility functions (A.5) and (A.7),
V (0, 0, ε) = V (0, 0, 1) + (R− L+ eR) log ε
i.e.
ε = exp {[V (α, τ, 1)− V (0, 0, 1)]/[R− L+ eR]}.
Finally, we define the size of income redistribution through the transfer system by
Dz =
√
Ez2.
The analytical calculations would be very complicated, therefore we rest satisfied
with numerical illustrations as before. Let the three annual discount factors be δ[w1, 1] =
0.9, δ[w2, 1] = 0.95, δ[w3, 1] = 1, and the common annual interest factor be ρ[1] = 1.02
(relative rather than real interest factor.
A simple computer calculation shows that the socially optimal contribution rate is
close to τ∗ = 0.25, regardless of the weight α. Table A1 displays the optimal efficiency
and the corresponding redistribution as α sinks from 1 to 0. The relative efficiency rises
from 1.394 to 1.488, while the standard deviation drops from 1.029 to 0.26 (at α = 0.75
near the minimum) and then rises again to 2.858. Depending on the importance of the
two indicators, the government may choose the weight of the NDC system. We suspect
12
that if we took into account the negative impact of flat benefits on labor supply, then
the social optimal share of the NDC would be higher.
Table A1. The impact of redistribution
Weight of Relative Standard deviation
proportional system efficiency of the balances
α ε Dz
1.00 1.394 1.029
0.75 1.424 0.260
0.50 1.448 0.913
0.25 1.470 1.867
0.00 1.488 2.858
Remark. τ = 0.25.
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